- Download my books for free
Update: February 22, 2017
I have videos of public attacks....more
- Important Updates
- All Previous Updates
New World War: Revolutionary Methods for Political Control
Dedication & Thanks
Volume I: Current Political Situation
- Revolution in Warfare
- The Other World
- Dictatorship Creation
- The Groups Facilitating the Revolution
- Their Goal is Neo-Feudalism
- Volume I Commentary
Volume II: The New War
- The New War
- The New Enemy
- Initiatives to Remove Civil Liberties
- The Investigation
- Surveillance Technology and Methods
- Volume II Commentary
Volume III: Weapons of The New War
- Introduction to Nonlethal Weapons
- Psychological Operations
- Introduction to Directed-Energy Weapons
- High-Powered Microwaves
- High-Powered Lasers
- Sonic Weapons
- Computer Network Operations
- Microwave Hearing
- Silent Subliminals
- Use of Citizen Informants
- Chemical and Biological
- Weather Warfare
- Miscellaneous Weapons and Tactics
- Volume III Commentary
Volume IV: The Coverup
- Volume IV Introduction
- Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders
- Control of the Medical Industry
- Another Look at Schizophrenia
- Political Considerations
- Punitive Psychiatry in Communist Russia
- Coverup Initiatives
- Volume IV Commentary
- A Brief History of PsyOp
- Small-Scale Wars
- Nongovernmental Organizations
- Human-Computer Intelligence Network
- Electronic Tyranny
- Other Devices Connected to the GIG
- My Experience
Part of this RMA includes a change in competing forces because most nations can’t challenge the US with a direct military force. Now that most nations have been conquered, either by military might or economic subversion, the regular state-to-state type of warfare will be phased out.
The US and its allies will now be waging war against individuals and groups all across the planet. The global military campaign being used to wage this new type of warfare has been called the global war on terror (GWOT), and the long war (LW). It was explained by the RAND Corporation in the book, In Athena’s Camp, this way: “In the future, few rational opponents will be likely to challenge, or will even be capable of challenging, the US in a contest with large, multi-dimensional military forces.”
Such an adversary, says RAND, will not seek to destroy the US with military power, but to ruin its core values, particularly if those values are not consistent with their deeply held religious, cultural, or ideological beliefs.
The United States Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies mentioned in its May 22, 2003 report, Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats: “Due to the conventional military dominance, the United States will most likely face regional threats that will challenge it through asymmetric approaches, such as area denial strategies, economic competition, and information warfare.”
Specific names given to the small wars that will be waged globally include, asymmetric warfare (AW), fourth generation warfare (4GW), third wave warfare (3WW), network centric warfare (NCW, netwar), NATO networked enabled capability (NNEC), and military operations other than war (MOOTW). Others are low-intensity conflict (LIC), irregular warfare (IW), and unconventional warfare (UW). Related terms include effects-based operations (EBO), civil-military operations (CMO), and peace operations (PO).
There is a variety of terms and definitions used to describe this type of warfare. The definition of a single term may be overlapping or contradictory, when multiple sources are observed. Some sources portray a particular type of warfare as synonymous with other types, thereby associating its characteristics with those other kinds.1
Some terms that have been replaced by more recent ones may still be used by some authors. Some are more or less theories than they are types of warfare. However, there is a pattern of strategies and tactics that these methods of warfare share, which I refer to as shared characteristics.
For the scope of this study, the types of warfare just mentioned are synonymous because they have been described as such by credible sources and because I’ve noticed that each contain most of the shared characteristics, which are:
- They are international, protracted, political wars that are fought among the people.
- They are an interagency joint effort between the military, federal law enforcement, and local and state law enforcement, which is known globally as the multinational force (MNF), as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
- They use the civilian population and private sector of the host nation (HN) during civil-military operations (CMO) against a state’s internal enemies.
- They must be perceived as legitimate by the host nation’s civilian population in order to gain their cooperation.2
- They rely on psychological operations, isolation, and nonlethal weapons, typically for the destruction of the enemy’s will.
- They use synchronization of tactics and strategies.
These wars are interagency, international operations that use a combined, highly coordinated and synchronized approach to achieve unity of effort, also called unified action, during attacks. The organizations that are involved include local and state law enforcement, which cooperates with federal agencies and the host nation’s military. In the United States this means the FBI, NSA, CIA, and FEMA.
The military forces of most countries are participating through an allied military force called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They are working with the civilian population as part of civil support, also called civil-military operations (CMO). Non-military participants include: nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and intergovernmental organizations (IGO). Nationally, this combined force is called the interagency; globally it’s called the multinational force (MNF).
The private sector is also involved. So, this includes not just people in communities, but workplaces, stores, restaurants, businesses, etc. Basically all of the core entities that compose a nation are involved. Some of these activities are being directed by the United Nations (UN).
Because of the advancements in communication, this interagency, international force, which is fused with the civilian population, functions as a single unit, or what the US Army refers to as unified action. Their activities on the strategic, operational, and tactical level are closely synchronized due to technological advancements.
Synchronization is a type of unified action which consists of multiple operations conducted simultaneously in the battlespace, usually at a high tempo. It is an ancient military tactic where the speed and sequence of attacks is arranged to achieve victory. It is a product of C4ISR (which will be explained shortly) and an important concept in this new type of warfare.
The US Army explains unified action as: “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. It involves the application of all instruments of national power, including actions of other government agencies and multinational military and nonmilitary organizations.”
Synchronization is an international, interagency function involving the UN, NATO, NGOs, government contractors, the private sector, as well as a HN’s military, local, state, and federal government agencies.
The idea is that launching multiple attacks or a series of attacks done in a particular sequence will have a multiplying effect that will “immobilize, suppress, or shock the enemy,” according to the US Army. Synchronization occurs on the strategic, operational, and tactical level.
It consists of a vertical and horizontal sharing (harmonizing) of information. On the vertical level, the type of environment, objective, and forces determine the guidance and flexibility necessary for an operation. Synchronization occurs horizontally across the battlespace on the tactical level between forces and organizations. The MNF uses automated computerized methods to synchronize information. The transmission of this information occurs frequently and quickly.
The activities that are synchronized continually change in relation to any new information obtained by intelligence. It involves the rapid processing and transmission of information gained by intelligence to commanders, planners, and forces in the battlespace.
Because of the speed at which the processing and transmission of information occurs, the attacks which are directed at an enemy may be the result of near-real-time, or even real-time intelligence. In the past, force maneuvers were delayed by the transmission of information. Now, due to technological advances, it is the commanders who must wait for their previous instructions to be executed before instantaneously transmitting the next set of commands, which may be the result of real-time intelligence.
The book, Understanding Information Age Warfare, by David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and David A. Signori, sponsored by RAND and MITRE Corporations, explains it this way: “In fact, as the speed of decisionmaking and information flows associated with the C2 process increase, the dynamics [attacks and movements] associated with the force elements in the physical domain will define the limits of overall synchronization.”
The battlefield for this new type of warfare has expanded into the civilian sector. For this reason, it’s now called the battlespace. The battlespace is global. The battles take place among the civilian population where the military uses civilians as irregular forces.
The physical architecture of the battlespace has several levels. At the top is the space level which includes satellites. The near-space level has UAVs and high-flying aircraft. Then there is the maneuver level which contains people, robots, vehicles, ships, and low-flying aircraft.3
“Defense of the Homeland involves a global, multi-domain battlespace,” proclaimed the Department of Defense in its June 2005, Strategy for Homeland and Civil Support report. “The global reach of potential and existing adversaries necessitates a global perspective.”
The civilian population is playing an important role in the expanded battlespace, according to the DOD. In order to succeed in these new missions, the actions of the military and civilian organizations will be coordinated far more closely than they were in the past. In its Network Centric Warfare publication of 2000 the DOD had this to say regarding the civilian population being used by the military: “Although civilians have been involved as victims and in supporting [combat] roles throughout history, they will play an increasingly important role in the battlespaces of the future.”
“The operational environment will expand to areas historically immune to battle,” the US Army tells us in its February 27, 2008 Field Manual Operations report, “including the continental United States and the territory of multinational partners, especially urban areas.” “All operations,” it continued, “will be conducted ‘among the people’ and outcomes will be measured in terms of effects on populations.”
According to the Army, the new enemy will increasingly seek protection among the civilian population. The essential “struggle of the future” they say, will take place primarily among civilians and will therefore require US security dominance in these areas.
Military campaigns have been typically directed from war rooms. They are also called command centers, or command and control centers (C2). A C2 center is a military term for a station which allows the planning, direction and control of operations, monitoring, decisionmaking, and execution.
The word communications was added to this term, making it C3, and eventually computers were added, amounting to C4. It is now referred to as C4ISR with the addition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.4 A more detailed explanation of this term follows.
Command is the formulation of intent such as planning, control is the information obtained from the results of the action taken, as well as the conclusion as to whether or not the action was successful. Communications and computers are the hardware and software used to implement the command and control.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are the hardware and software systems of sensors, people, data collectors, and platforms, as well as the use of tools to extract the information from data. These are collectively referred to as C4ISR.
C4ISR has multiple interacting components including: battlespace monitoring, awareness, understanding, sensemaking, command intent, battlespace management, synchronization, and information systems. Most C4ISR centers are equipped with computers and communications that collect, process, filter, store, display, and disseminate information, according to predefined policies. Physical C4ISR centers can be mobile or stationary and due to the possibility of online meetings, they may be virtual as well.
In the late 1960s, the police in the US began to use these centers to deal with disturbances in major cities. One of the first to be used by police in New York City is known as the Special Police Radio Inquiry Network (SPRINT).
SPRINT referred all incidents to the department’s computer which fused it with other relevant data in the database then sent it to radio dispatchers, who observed the incident on a computer in its relation to patrol cars in the area and contacted the appropriate one.
Riot control rooms which were connected to the SPRINT were then setup in New York City in 1969 with closed-circuit TV cameras, deployable helicopters, and fixed cameras in the city. Similar ones were created in the late 1970s in Los Angeles.
By 1969 the Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (DCDPO) had built a domestic war room in the Pentagon to monitor political protests, according to a 1972 Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights report, Army Surveillance of Civilians. It was constructed based on ones used in Vietnam and was equipped with situational maps, computers, closed circuit TVs, hot lines, illuminated switchboards, etc.
Similar centers were created in the late 1960s across the US, which were run by the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) to monitor protesters. According to the Senate report, the DCDPO viewed these peaceful protesters not as loyal Americans exercising constitutional rights, but as “dissident forces” in a counterinsurgency war.
The BSSR mentioned that the police, military, and decisionmakers would be increasingly working together at these centers using advanced technology that allowed for the real-time collection of information and the immediate deployment of resources to deal with domestic threats.
The C4ISR centers that are used by civilian and military forces when dealing with domestic threats in the new war are known as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs). NATO calls them civil-military cooperation centers (CIMICs). The CMOC is the physical meeting center for civil affairs units. They are located in the civilian sector and there may be more than one in a city. CMOCs can also be virtual through online networks.
The deployed civil-military units are also equipped with the latest tactical communications equipment including digital radios (DR) and are in constant contact with the CMOC. These centers are also connected to the Global Information Grid (GIG), which will be discussed shortly.
Daily meetings take place at these centers between representatives of the military, NGOs, IGOs, private sector businesses, civilian leaders, local officials, and government agencies. One of the primary IGOs is the UN, which is represented by state department officials. Some of the discussions which occur at these meetings include information pertaining to ongoing activities against domestic threats.
The CMOC receives and validates information regarding domestic threats in the AO. This information may originate from the interagency or another source. It then forwards the requests to the local civil-military force for action. The CMOC also coordinates the activities of civilian-military forces at the tactical level, and is in constant contact with these forces.
The DOD’s change to NCW, which uses geographically dispersed and organizationally complex units consisting of relatively small forces, required an extensive information capability to quickly and efficiently track down an adversary that could be anywhere on the planet.
The Global Information Grid (GIG), developed partially by the MITRE Corporation, provides this capability. The GIG has been called the DOD’s global C4ISR unit for netwar. It is a globally interconnected set of information, capabilities, processes, applications, sensors, weapons, and management tools.
Its information management allows for the collection, processing, storing, and distribution of information. This information is instantly available to authorized users such as warfighters, decisionmakers, and support personnel. Authorized people can use a variety of different devices/systems to securely access the information anytime, anyplace on the planet. It also connects facilities such as bases, posts, camps, stations, and mobile platforms.
It allows for community collaboration of its geographically dispersed users. It can connect tactical forces with decisionmakers, essentially placing the decisionmakers in the battlespace. Sensors and other intelligence sources connected to the GIG provide real-time situational awareness throughout the entire battlespace.
The exceptional situational awareness, provided by instantaneous communication, allows for better decisionmaking. Also networked with the GIG are directed-energy weapons and other types of electronic warfare capabilities. The GIG uses existing commercial satellite and ground-based systems as its backbone. GIG nodes such as aircraft, vehicles, and ships are equipped with a digital radio (DR) known as the joint tactical radio system (JTRS), which is a type of computer that runs a radio application.5
The GIG will eventually integrate all of the DOD’s information systems, services, and applications into a seamless, reliable, secure, network. The GIG is also connected to communications systems used by coalition and allied forces. According to some sources, the integration of all DOD elements into the GIG won’t be completed until 2020. However, it has been functional since 2005.
Each service has its own tactical mobile C4ISR system which is similar and connected to the GIG. The Marines and Navy use ForceNet, the Air Force uses Command and Control Constellation (C2 Constellation), the Army’s is LandWarNet and the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WINT-T).
Before explaining these tactical communications systems in more detail, it will be helpful to be familiar with the tactical mobile networks that forces are now using as a result of the DOD’s transition to netwar. These mobile networks allow for real-time information sharing and synchronization, and therefore facilitate the battleswarm.
As part of the transformation to NCW the military has increasingly used a type of wireless, self-configuring, mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which is based on the mesh network standard. MANET technology was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the US Army, and the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and has existed since at least the mid 1990s.
A MANET does not require a fixed router infrastructure used in a regular network. Instead, each device/node contains as a wireless router and is capable of sending and receiving data. These mobile nodes form a mobile mesh network with each other in an ad hoc manner. Each node can move independently in any direction by frequently and dynamically changing its links to other devices. MANETs are rugged, secure, spectrum-agile, mobile networks that form a communications system from the strategic to the tactical level.
To transfer data, a MANET uses existing wireless communications systems such as wireless LANs, cellular, and satellite networks. They can function on their own or be connected to the internet.
The physical devices used in a MANET are sometimes referred to as nodes, which have integrated network devices such as wireless routers and omnidirectional antennas. The nodes can be placed on aircraft, boats, vehicles, and even people. A particular device which allows for the creation of a MANET is the digital radio (DR), also called the software-defined radio (SDR). The military’s version of the DR is the JTRS.
JTRS is a vital part of NCW. It is to be used by the various services deployed in the tactical areas of the battlespace to communicate seamlessly through MANETs. JTRS were designed in the mid 1990s by defense contractors for the US military. The technology for JTRS, however, goes back to the 1980s when they were developed by the military to be used as part of electronic warfare (EW).
A JTRS is a computer that can be programmed to imitate a radio. Like a computer, it runs applications, which can be added and configured. One of these applications allows it to mimic a radio. A JTRS can be upgraded and programmed remotely.
JTRS are multi-band, multi-mode, multi-channel radios with digital/analog converters that have computer networking capabilities. They use a wideband networking waveform which allows them to access a range of frequencies from 2 MHz to 2 GHz, including from HF to UHF.
They allow for the wireless transmission of data, voice, and multimedia files between nodes in the battlespace using MANETS. Some have sensors which provide information pertaining to the environment in real-time. JTRS are also connected to the GIG, and can communicate with satellites using GPS receivers. They are capable of establishing communication with all other levels of command.
Because the regular physical components of a radio, such as mixers, filters, amplifiers, and modulators are run by software, JTRS have a small, open physical architecture. These devices can be placed on ships, aircraft, and vehicles, tiny robots, worn on clothing, or used in handheld devices.
Another type of JTRS is the cognitive radio (CR), which, in addition to the JTRS capabilities, has artificial intelligence (AI). It was first introduced in 1999 as an extension of the SDR/JTRS. DARPA has been involved in the creation of CRs through programs such as the Adaptive Cognition-Enhanced Radio Teams (ACERT), and Situation Aware Protocols in Edge Network Technologies (SAPIENT). Like JTRS, a CR is a computer that can run a radio application to mimic radio signal processing. Its physical architecture is small because all of the regular hardware components associated with radio signal reception is run by software.
The CR is an intelligent device that is aware of itself, the needs of the user, and the environment. It understands, learns from, and adapts to its environment. The CR is not just programmable, it is trainable. It can be trained by the user or its network. And a CR is not just aware of its location, it is aware its environment. Using its sensors, it continually monitors the internal and external environment and adjusts its parameters based on user behavior, network state, and the radio frequency environment.
The CR is aware of environmental factors including heating, doors, ventilation, air conditioning, lighting, appliances, and electronic devices such as telephones, pagers, etc. It can also be equipped with audio, video, and many other types of sensors. It can be programmed to respond in a specific way when the sensors detect something particular.
Like other digital radios the CR uses existing signals from cellular, radio, and satellite systems. It continually monitors these systems and adjusts its transmission and reception parameters to function within the range of unused frequencies emanating from these sources, which it uses to forms MANETs.
The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is one of the Army’s C4ISR systems. It is a mobile tactical communications network that provides reliable, secure, seamless video, data, image, and voice transfer during combat. It is the Army’s tactical portion of the GIG. It allows for the continuous communications on the move with joint, allied, and coalition forces.
WIN-T facilitates real-time organization of battlespace nodes using JTRS which create MANETS to keep mobile forces connected and synchronized. These MANETS allow warfighters to maintain constant battlespace situational awareness while on the move and to synchronize their attacks more precisely.
It was designed for joint operations so the commander could conduct multiple simultaneous missions. It allows commanders at all levels who may be stationed at various locations throughout the battlespace to collaborate, providing tactical communication from the GIG to the battlespace commander. WIN-T links warfighters in the battlespace with decisionmakers. It was built by General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Cisco Systems, and BAE Systems. The backbone for this network consists of existing terrestrial, airborne, and satellite communications systems.
LandWarNet is another tactical communications system used by the US Army which connects to the GIG. It is the Army’s enterprise system that moves information through a seamless network from the operational level down to the tactical level of the individual soldier. It provides integrated applications, services, and network capabilities at every level.
LandWarNet uses JTRS to create a self-forming, self-synchronizing MANETs which allows “opportunistic alliances” to join the force and attack a target. It automatically dispatches nodes in an area to join the network. If connectivity is temporarily lost by a node, then priority nodes retain support by following predetermined policies.
It also allows the commander to conduct continuous operations simultaneously. The widest range of strategic, operational, and tactical resources are available to the warfighter because LandWarNet synchronizes forces on land, air, space, and sea. Weapons platforms and sensors, as well as services and applications are also connected.
NGOs, the interagency, and other decisionmakers can be connected to the force at the tactical level using LandWarNet. Extraordinary situational awareness of the operation is achieved by constant intelligence updates from sensors and other netcentric service updates, up to the highest levels, that have an impact on the operation. All of this is available to the warfighter in real-time while on the move.
ForceNet is a reliable, robust C4ISR system used by the Navy and Marines which links nodes such as people, sensors, networks, and weapons into a networked combat force. It is used across the entire battlespace, from sea, to space, to land, and is integrated with C4ISR systems of other services.
It stores, processes, and synthesizes large amounts of information from all nodes in a repository that is available to users if they have proper security clearance. It uses a visual representation to allow decisionmakers the ability to see situational information and provides decisionmaking tools for combat operations and logistics. It allows leaders at every level to access vast amounts of information.
With ForceNet, warfighters are able to synchronize their attacks throughout the battlespace. By connecting distributed groups of decisionmakers, warfighters, and allied forces to a common C4ISR, it allows for unprecedented levels of situational awareness, essentially making them an integrated fighting force.
The Command and Control Constellation (C2 Constellation) is the portion of the GIG used by the Air Force for NCW, which allows for the collaborative planning and synchronization of attacks. Its NCW-enabled C2 Constellation allows for the integration and collaboration between different nodes including satellites, weapons platforms, vehicles, and aircraft, down to small devices such as PDAs.
Warfighters connected to C2 Constellation are provided with intelligence updates from a sensor network that spans from land to space. These air, space, and terrestrial nodes are available as resources to the warfighter. Joint and coalition forces are also connected to this. C2 Constellation uses JTRS to form MANETs.
1 The US Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (FM 3-05.130) manual of September 2008, states that although the terms fourth generation warfare (4GW) and asymmetric warfare (AW) are not an actual DOD terms and are not exactly the same as UW, they have been used to describe unconventional warfare (UW) and irregular warfare (IW) because there are similarities. The book Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, by Lt Col, David J. Dean, USAF, describes low-intensity conflict (LIC) as being similar to unconventional warfare. LIC is also the same as irregular warfare (IW), small wars, military operations other than war (MOOTW), unconventional warfare (UW), and asymmetric warfare (AW), according to the August 2006, Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare article, by the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command and US Special Operations Command Center. The Land Warfare Papers report entitled Defining Asymmetric Warfare of September 2006, similarly places low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the same category as irregular warfare (IW), asymmetric warfare (AW), and military operations other than war (MOOTW). The Department of Defense, Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) report Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War, of November 2002, infers that asymmetric warfare (AW) and effects-based operations (EBO) are the same by using them interchangeably. It also indicates that netwar is a component of EBO, and that they can be used in combination. RAND's book In Athena's Camp suggests that terms such as network centric warfare (netwar), military operations other than war (MOOTW), low-intensity conflict (LIC), and even revolution in military affairs (RMA), have been used interchangeably. The article Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats, published in August of 2005 by the Institute for Defense Analyses for Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, says that fourth generation warfare (4GW), asymmetric warfare (AW), and unconventional warfare (UW) are basically the same. There is no agreed upon name for this type of warfare according to the Joint Warfighting Center's Irregular Warfare Special Study of August 4, 2006, which proclaims that it's been labeled unconventional warfare (UW), fourth generation warfare (4GW), irregular warfare (IW), situations short of war, etc. What this means is that there is no single term for the new war, and that although there are differences in the multiple terms that are used, they're basically the same.
2 There are many references in government sources regarding legitimacy. Almost all of them state that these operations must be perceived as legitimate by the civilian population which it uses to combat these new enemies. It is the perception of legitimacy which they emphasize, rather than the actual practice of being legitimate. "Legitimacy is a condition growing from the perception of a specific audience of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions," says the US Army in its Peace Operations Field Manual of December 30, 1994. The September 2008 Unconventional Warfare report of the US Army Special Operations Forces explained it this way: "The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state. The basis for legitimacy is the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken, as well as the will of the US public to support the actions. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. … Creating and maintaining an enduring, functioning state requires the government to be legitimate in the eyes of the population." Notice how this material suggests that the actions of the MNF must not necessarily be legitimate, only appear legitimate to the people. The Military Operations Other Than War article by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes legitimacy as, "a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions." It continues: "If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action, and in MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element." These and other documents indicate that those directing these forces are concerned primarily with the appearance of legitimacy. "Legitimacy is perceived by interested audiences as the legality, morality, or fairness of a set of actions," the Peace Operations Joint Publication of October 17, 2007 tells us. "Such audiences may include the US public, foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces. If a PO is perceived as legitimate by both the citizens of the nations contributing the forces and the citizens of the country being entered, the PO will have a better chance of long-term success."
3 For simplification purposes, this is a modified version of the various layers in NCW described in the MITRE Corporation's October 24, 2005 article, From Netted Sensors to Swarming, which contains more layers and elements.
4 I've noticed that the term C4ISR has been described in several ways. It can mean a physical location such as a C2 Center or a War Room. It can also describe a communications system consisting of hardware and software. For instance, LandWarNet, ForceNet, Air Force C2, and WIN-T have been explained as C4ISR hardware/software systems. The term can be used to depict the concept of communication. It also seems to be used to explain a combination of these.
5 According to the Department of Defense's June 2007 publication Global Information Grid Architectural Vision, communications technology used in the GIG will include a tiny hands-free computer that is embedded in clothing and is presumably undetectable to the casual observer. This will allow the DOD to be connected to individuals in a covert manner and direct them in real-time. The DOD also mentioned an interest in linking people to the GIG using human computer interaction (HCI), which is a highly advanced natural way that allows people to interact with the GIG. The interaction is characterized by sensory channels and cognitive capabilities that are fused with communications. Although the description of HCI used for this purpose is brief and vague, the goal seems to be the transfer of information directly into a person's sensory pathways (e.g. auditory and visual). DARPA has developed the Small Unit Operations Situational Awareness System (SUO-SAS), which is an ad hoc network that allows dismounted warfighters to covertly and securely communicate with others in complex environments such as urban or wooded terrains. While the details provided by DARPA pertaining to SUO-SAS are minimal, this reveals another interest in covert communication technology. See the DARPA report, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, March 27, 2003, by Dr. Tony Tether. The US Army's Bioeffects of Selected Nonlethal Weapons report of 1998 similarly mentioned that microwave hearing could be used to send private messages to people. The military's interest in using this technology, which was demonstrated in a basic form several decades ago, was also reported in the Wired article of February 18, 2008, Pentagon Report: Nonlethal Weapons Could Target Brain, Mimic Schizophrenia. The 1995 DOD contract entitled Communicating via the Microwave Auditory Effect (F41624-95-C-9007) revealed an interest to communicate with military personnel by transmitting instructions directly into their brains. It described a revolutionary technology that had already been demonstrated with microwave hearing that could be used for numerous purposes including special operations.